Municipal Liability under City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: Federalism, Due Process, and the Implications of a Restricted Section 1983 Remedy by Wolf, Renee I.
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly
Volume 13
Number 4 Summer 1986 Article 4
1-1-1986
Municipal Liability under City of Oklahoma City v.
Tuttle: Federalism, Due Process, and the
Implications of a Restricted Section 1983 Remedy
Renee I. Wolf
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/
hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly
Part of the Constitutional Law Commons
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in
Hastings Constitutional Law Quarterly by an authorized editor of UC Hastings Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
wangangela@uchastings.edu.
Recommended Citation
Renee I. Wolf, Municipal Liability under City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle: Federalism, Due Process, and the Implications of a Restricted
Section 1983 Remedy, 13 Hastings Const. L.Q. 733 (1986).
Available at: https://repository.uchastings.edu/hastings_constitutional_law_quaterly/vol13/iss4/4
NOTES
Municipal Liability under City of Oklahoma
City v. Tuttle: Federalism, Due Process,
and the Implications of a Restricted
Section 1983 Remedy
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union ren-
dering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails and
the collection of the revenue dangerous. That the power to correct
these evils is beyond the control of State authorities I do not doubt;
that the power of the Executive of the United States, acting within
the limits of existing laws, is sufficient for present emergencies, is
not clear. Therefore, I urgently recommend such legislation as in
the judgment of Congress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and
property, and the enforcement of law in all parts of the United
States.'
Throughout the American past, our jurisprudence has been troubled
by the question of which tribunal-state or federal court-should hear
claims arising from the violation of federal constitutional rights by per-
sons acting under color of state law. The Fourteenth Amendment pro-
tects against the deprivation of life, liberty, and property without due
process of law.2 Although title 42, section 1983 of the United States
Code3 provides a federal remedy for violations of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, the states have a legitimate interest in adjudicating claims of
abuses by its officers.
1. Message sent to Congress by President Grant, cited in Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167,
172-73 (1961) (quoting CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 244 (1871)).
2. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV § 1.
3. Title 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982) grants a private right of action to redress violations of
constitutional rights committed by persons acting under color of state law. The statute
provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or us-
age, of any State ... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States ... to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1983 was enacted pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment; it created no sub-
stantive rights in and of itself. See Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
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In the years since the passage of the 1964 Civil Rights Act,4 the
number of civil fights suits pursued in the federal court system has risen
exponentially.5 As victims of police misconduct began to join municipal-
ities as defendants under section 1983, the United States Supreme Court,
as well as the federal courts, issued decisions designed to stem the tide of
section 1983 suits flooding the federal court system.6 Consequently, vin-
dicating and protecting constitutional rights through federal causes of
action became less important to federal judges than the interests of feder-
alism7 and clearing the federal court dockets.' Against this backdrop,
the Supreme Court decided City of Oklahoma City v. Tuttle.9
This Note addresses the Tuttle Court's treatment of municipal lia-
bility for a supervisory official's failure to remedy police misconduct. Af-
ter discussing the facts in Tuttle, this Note examines: (1) the history and
purpose of section 1983 as interpreted by the Supreme Court in Monroe
v. Pape,I° Monell v. Department of Social Services,11 and Rizzo v. Goode;12
(2) the Tuttle decision; and (3) the contours of municipal liability and the
problems generated after Tuttle. The ramifications of Tuttle are evalu-
ated in light of federalism, due process, and the inadequacy of the reme-
dies afforded in state courts to vindicate federal constitutional rights.
This Note concludes that if the federal courts are to foster municipal
responsibility for individual rights as guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment, Tuttle should be limited to its particular facts and narrowly
construed.
4. Pub. L. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (July 2, 1964).
5. See Project, Suing the Police in Federal Court, 88 YALE L.J. 781, 781 n.3 (1979)
("Suits against police officers brought under the civil rights statutes have increased from 2,000
in 1971 to over 6,000 in 1977 .... Civil rights actions in general have increased from 287 in
1960 to 13,113 in 1977 ...... ) (citing Police: Under Fire, Fighting Back, U.S. NEws & WORLD
REPORT, April 3, 1978, at 39); Maine v. Thiboutot, 448 U.S. 1, 27 n.16 (1980)(between 1961
and 1979, the number of civil rights actions-predominantly section 1983-filed in federal
court rose from 296 to 24,951) (citing DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE
U.S. COURTS ANNUAL REPORT, at A16-A17, Table C-3 (1979)).
6. See infra note 40.
7. See Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MICH. L. REv. 5, 26-30 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Kupfer, Restructuring the Monroe Doctrine: Current Litigation Under Sec-
tion 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 463, 473 n.57 (1982) (" 'It is difficult to resist the conclu-
sion that much of this federal door closing is not so much a function of enlightened federalism
or even an evolving political environment as of crowded dockets.' ") (citing Weinberg, The
New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. REv. 1191, 1203 (1977) (footnote omitted)).
9. 105 S. Ct. 2427 (1985).
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961), overruled in part, 436 U.S. 658 (1978). For a discussion of
Monroe, see infra notes 18-30 and accompanying text.
11. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
12. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
I. An Introduction to the Supreme Court Decision in City of
Oklahoma City v. Tuttle
In Tuttle, after her husband was killed by an Oklahoma City police
officer, the plaintiff brought a section 1983 action against the city alleging
that it failed to adequately train its police force. The fatal incident arose
when Officer Julian Rotramel responded to an all-points bulletin of a
robbery in progress at an Oklahoma City bar. 3 Officer Rotramel was
the first to arrive on the scene, where he recognized Albert Tuttle from
the bulletin's description of the alleged robber. While questioning the
barmaid, who declared that no robbery had taken place, Officer Ro-
tramel tried to restrain Mr. Tuttle inside the bar. Mr. Tuttle broke free
from the officer's hold, however, and ran outside.14 Officer Rotramel fol-
lowed Mr. Tuttle onto the street, finding him crouched on the ground
with his hands near his boot. Officer Rotramel ordered Mr. Tuttle to
halt, but as Mr. Tuttle rose from his crouched position, the officer shot
him, explaining later that he believed Mr. Tuttle had removed a gun
from his boot.15
Mrs. Tuttle filed suit under section 1983 for the wrongful depriva-
tion of her husband's constitutional rights, naming both Officer Rotramel
and the City of Okalahoma City as defendants. Despite the jury's finding
that Officer Rotramel's use of force was excessive and unlawful, he was
absolved of personal liability based on his good faith belief that his life
was in danger. 6 As to the municipal defendant, Mrs. Tuttle produced
an expert who testified that the city's training curriculum was grossly
inadequate. The judge's instructions to the jury, however, permitted the
jury to find the city liable based solely upon the incident of excessive
force, without consideration of the expert's testimony."7
13. 105 S. Ct. at 2429.
14. Id. at 2430.
15. Id. Mr. Tuttle was later found to have a toy pistol in his boot.
16. The good faith immunity protects officers when their illegal or unconstitutional acts
are committed in good faith, i.e., without malice or intent to illegally deprive a person of
constitutionally protected rights. Voutour v. Vitale, 761 F.2d 812, 818 (1st Cir. 1985); York v.
City of San Pablo, 626 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985). The Supreme Court, in Owen v. City of
Independence, 445 U.S. 622 (1980), held that the good faith immunity does not attach to a
government entity when its agents have been absolved of liability by way of good faith. See
also Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800 (1982).
17. 105 S. Ct. at 2435. The trial judge instructed the jury as follows:
If a police officer denies a person his constitutional rights, the city that employs
that officer is not liable for such a denial of the right simply because of the employ-
ment relationship.... But there are circumstances under which a city is liable for a
deprivation of a constitutional right. Where the official policy of the city causes an
employee of the city to deprive a person of such rights in the execution of that policy,
the city may be liable.
Absent more evidence of supervisory indifference, such as acquiescence in a
prior matter of conduct, official policy such as to impose liability . . . under the
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The Court concluded that Mrs. Tuttle could not state a cause of
action against the city based solely upon one incident of a police officer's
excessive use of force. Consistent with a long history of section 1983
interpretation, this resolution of Tuttle reflects the Court's current trend
to limit the scope and availability of the section 1983 remedy.
II. A Historical Perspective of Section 1983 Litigation
A. Monroe v. Pape: Fashioning a Remedy under Section 1983
The scope of section 1983 as a mode of redress for unconstitutional
acts committed by police officers, acting under the authority of state law,
was not realized prior to the Supreme Court's decision in Monroe.
Monroe arose from an incident involving thirteen Chicago police officers.
The officers unlawfully searched and ransacked the petitioner's home,
detained him at a police station without an opportunity to consult coun-
sel or appear before a magistrate for arraignment, and ultimately released
him without pressing criminal charges.I8 The lower courts dismissed the
plaintiff's section 1983 claim as to all the defendants, including the City
of Chicago and the individual officers involved in the incident.19
The Supreme Court characterized the issue in Monroe as "whether
Congress, in enacting section... [1983], meant to give a remedy to par-
ties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges and immunities by an of-
ficial's abuse of his position."2 Recognizing the function of section 1983
as a remedy for the deprivation of rights protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment, the Court's inquiry focused on whether section 1983 should
be construed as coexistent with, or precluded by, state common law tort
remedies.
In its analysis of the statute, the Monroe Court noted that section
1983 was "one of the means whereby Congress exercised the power
vested in it by section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment to enforce the
provisions of that Amendment."21 From the Congressional debates sur-
rounding the passage of the 1871 Act, the Court identified three express
purposes of section 1983: First, section 1983 was enacted to "override
certain [invidious] state laws," where the state substantive law was
federal Civil Rights Act cannot ordinarily be inferred from a single incident of ille-
gality such as a first excessive use of force to stop a suspect; but a single, unusually
excessive use of force may be sufficiently out of the ordinary to warrant an inference
that it was attributable to inadequate training or supervision amounting to "deliberate
indifference" or "gross negligence" on the part of the officials in charge.... Further-
more, the plaintiff must show a causal link between the police misconduct and the
adoption of a policy or plan by the defendant municipality.
Id. at 2430-31 (emphasis in original).
18. 365 U.S. at 169.
19. Id. at 170.
20. Id. at 172.
21. Id. at 171 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., App. 68, 80, 83-85 (1871)).
facially unconstitutional;22 second, it "provided a remedy where state law
was inadequate," such as where federal law provided remedies or proce-
dures unavailable in state courts;23 and third, it "provide[d] a federal
remedy where the state remedy, though adequate in theory, was not
available in practice."24
Based on this legislative history, the Monroe Court concluded that
Congress intended section 1983 to supplement state common law tort
remedies:
It is abundantly clear that one reason the legislation was passed
was to afford a federal right in federal courts because, by reason of
prejudice, passion, neglect, intolerance or otherwise, state laws
might not be enforced and the claims of citizens to the enjoyment
of rights, privileges, and immunities guaranteed by the Fourteenth
Amendment might be denied by the state agencies.
It is no answer that the State has a law which if enforced would
give relief. The federal remedy is supplementary to the state rem-
edy, and the latter need not be first sought and refused before the
federal one is invoked.
25
The Court held that Congress intended section 1983 to remedy violations
of constitutional rights committed by city police officers, but that munici-
pal corporations were not "persons" within the meaning of the statute
26
and thus, that a section 1983 suit could not be maintained against a mu-
nicipality itself.27 This conclusion was based on Congress' rejection of
the proposed "Sherman amendment" to the 1871 Ku Klux Klan Act,
28
which "would have made 'the inhabitants of the county, city, or parish'
in which certain acts of violence occurred liable 'to pay full compensa-
tion' to the person damaged or his widow or legal representative.
'29
22. 365 U.S. at 173.
23. Id. For example, a black person in Kentucky could not testify against a white person
in state court, but he or she could so testify in federal court. By prohibiting blacks from
testifying on their own behalf against whites, the state courts essentially deprived blacks of a
remedy when they were wronged, and of a defense when they were accused. See id. at 173-74
(citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess., 345 (1871) (remarks of Senator Sherman)).
24. Id. at 174. This theory is premised on the fact that certain Southern states were un-
able or unwilling to control the activities of the Ku Klux Klan, and thus failed to "enforce the
laws with an equal hand." Id.
25. Id. at 180, 183 (emphasis added).
26. 365 U.S. at 191 n.50. Compare Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. Ry., 118 U.S.
394 (1886) (corporations are considered "persons" for purposes of the Equal Protection Clause
of the Fifth Amendment, and the Due Process and Equal Protection Clauses of the Fourteenth
Amendment).
27. 365 U.S. at 187, 192.
28. Section one of the 1871 Act was the precursor to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1982).
29. 365 U.S. at 188 (citing CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., Ist Sess., 663 (1871)). Although
the amendment passed in the Senate, it was rejected by the House of Representatives.
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The rejection of municipal liability under section 1983 weakened the
statute's remedial function because, as a practical matter, a judgment
against an individual police officer could not compensate the plaintiff,
nor have the desired effect on municipal policies and police practices, as
would a judgment casting blame on the municipal entity. To join a mu-
nicipality as a defendant after Monroe, a plaintiff would have to pursue
state remedies. Although the Monroe Court acknowledged the possible
inadequacy of state law to effectively remedy a wrong of constitutional
dimension,30 it declined to address this issue until seventeen years later,
in Monell.
B. Monell v. Department of Social Services: Municipal Liability for
"Custom" or "Policy"
In Monell, female employees of the Department of Social Services
and the Board of Education of New York challenged a city policy which
required pregnant employees to take a mandatory maternity leave before
it was medically necessary to do so. The Supreme Court held that the
plaintiffs stated a cause of action against the city, overruling that portion
of Monroe which held municipalities could not be sued under section
1983.31 Based on a "fresh analysis of the debate on the [1871 Ku Klux
Klan Act]," the Court found Monroe had incorrectly interpreted Con-
gress' rejection of the Sherman amendment.32 What Congress rejected in
1871, the Monell Court reasoned, was the imposition of municipal liabil-
ity for actions of "persons riotously and tumultously assembled;",3 3 Con-
gress did not intend that a municipality should be immune from "its own
violations of the Fourteenth Amendment.,
34
The Monell Court then proceeded to define the contours of munici-
pal liability under section 1983. Expressly rejecting a theory of liability
based on respondeat superior,35 the Court held a municipality could only
be liable pursuant to a governmental "custom" or "policy":
Local governing bodies.., can be sued directly under section
1983 for monetary, declaratory, or injunctive relief where, as here,
30. The Monroe Court concluded:
It is said that doubts should be resolved in favor of municipal liability because private
remedies against officers for illegal searches and seizures are conspicuously ineffec-
tive, and because municipal liability will not only afford plaintiffs responsible defend-
ants but cause those defendants to eradicate abuses that exist at the police level. We
do not reach those policy considerations.
365 U.S. at 191 (footnotes omitted).
31. 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978).
32. Id. at 665.
33. Id. at 666.
34. Id. at 683 (emphasis added).
35. Id. at 691 ("a municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor" (emphasis in original)). See W. PROSSER & W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON
ON TORTS §§ 69-70 (5th ed 1984).
the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements or exe-
cutes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision offi-
cially adopted and promulgated by that body's officers. Moreover,
although the touchstone of the section 1983 action against a gov-
ernment body is an allegation that official policy is responsible for a
deprivation of rights protected by the Constitution, local govern-
ments, like every other section 1983 "person," by the very terms of
the statute, may be sued for constitutional deprivations visited pur-
suant to governmental "custom" even though such a custom has
not received formal approval through the body's official decision-
making channels .... "Congress included customs and usages [in
section 1983] because of the persistent and widespread discrimina-
tory practices of state officials.... Although not authorized by
written law, such practices of state officials could well be so perma-
nent and well settled as to constitute a 'custom' or usage with the
force of law.",
36
Under Monell, "custom" includes any act promulgated by municipal em-
ployees which is sanctioned through the acquiescence of policymaking
officials. Monell contemplates, therefore, that municipalities may be lia-
ble not only for official action in promulgating policy, but also for official
"inaction" in the face of unconstitutional practices by subordinates.
37
36. Id. at 690-91 (citations omitted). In formulating this theory, the Court relied on
Adickes v. S.H. Kress, 398 U.S. 144 (1970). Adickes involved an action brought under sections
1983 and 1985 (a conspiracy statute) after the plaintiff, a white woman, was denied service in a
restaurant and subsequently arrested because she was accompanied by blacks. The complaint
against the restaurant owner, a private party, was held to state a cause of action under section
1983, provided the plaintiff could prove that the defendant "refused her service because of a
state-enforced custom of compelling segregation" in local restaurants. Id. at 169. The Court
further held that the plaintiff could prove this state-enforced custom by showing that the res-
taurant employee and the police officer "reached an understanding to deny [her] service ... or
to cause her subsequent arrest" because she was in the company of blacks. Id. at 152. It is this
type of invidious discrimination, enforced and sanctioned by the state, which Monell sought to
remedy by ruling that unofficial customs could rise to the level of official "policy" for purposes
of municipal liability.
37. 436 U.S. at 690-91. Claims against municipalities based on official inaction have gen-
erally received a favorable reception in the federal courts. See Gilmore v. City of Atlanta, 774
F.2d 1495, 1504 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (recognizing that acts of non policymaking employees could
establish municipal custom under Monell, but holding an isolated incident insufficient to es-
tablish such a policy); Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981) (woman
beaten and threatened by police officer stated a cause of action for failure to properly hire,
train, supervise, discipline, and control defendant and other police officers); Turpin v. Mailet,
619 F.2d 196, 2,01 (2d Cir.), cert denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980) (recognizing a cause of action
based on failure to discipline, but holding evidence insufficient to sustain a finding of liability);
Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (cause of
action for failure to train and supervise police sustained: the court held that one excessively
brutal incident was sufficient to create an inference of policy); Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566
F.2d 817, 832 (2d Cir. 1977) ("Where conduct of the supervisory authority is directly related
to the denial of a constitutional right it is not to be distinguished, as a matter of causation,
upon whether it was action or inaction."); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1108-09
(E.D.N.C. 1984) (sustaining the plaintiff's cause of action for official inaction based on the
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Lower courts have interpreted Monell to mean that when an offi-
cial's indifference to the unconstitutional practices of subordinates
amounts to "tacit authorization" of such practices, then those practices
may be attributed to municipal policy, and the municipality can be
named as a defendant in a section 1983 suit.38  The lower courts are in
disagreement, however, over what facts must be alleged in the plaintiff's
pleadings to defeat a municipal defendant's motion to dismiss-an issue
that has never been directly addressed by the Supreme Court.39
In resolving this question, the courts have had to balance the com-
peting interests in section 1983 litigation: vindicating a plaintiff's consti-
city's failure to respond to past instances of police misconduct); Popow v. City of Margate, 476
F. Supp. 1237, 1242 (D.N.J. 1979) (upholding cause of action for failure to adequately train,
supervise, and discipline, when failure amounted to gross negligence or recklessness); Leite v.
City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590-91 (D.R.I. 1978) (recognizing a cause of action for
failure to train police when their training was so reckless or grossly negligent that future police
misconduct was almost inevitable).
Those cases which cast doubt on the viability of a section 1983 claim for official inaction
generally turn on the insufficiency of the pleadings, and on the absence of a showing of a
"causal link" between the policy alleged and the constitutional violation suffered. See, e.g.,
Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 767 (7th Cir. 1985) ("A complaint that tracks Mo-
nell's requirement of official policy with bare allegations cannot stand when the policy identi-
fied is nothing more than acquiescence in prior misconduct."); Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d
30, 33 (5th Cir. 1982) ("a policy cannot be inferred from a municipality's isolated decision not
to discipline a single officer for a single incident of illegality"); Thurman v. City of Torrington,
595 F. Supp 1521 (D. Conn. 1984); Appletree v. City of Hartford, 555 F. Supp. 224 (D. Conn.
1983); Schramm v. Krischell, 84 F.R.D. 294 (D. Conn. 1979); Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F.
Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978); see discussion of Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362 (1976), infra notes
48-64 and accompanying text.
38. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220, 1224 (8th Cir. 1981). See also Turpin v. Mallet:
We... reject at the outset appellant's suggestion that an "official policy" within the
meaning of Monell cannot be inferred from informal acts or omissions of supervisory
municipal officials. Indeed, by holding that a municipality can be held liable for its
"custom" Monell recognized that less than formal municipal conduct can in some
instances give rise to municipal liability under section 1983. To require that senior
officials must have formally adopted or promulgated a policy before their conduct
may be treated as "official" would for present purposes render Monell a nullity, ex-
alting form over substance.
619 F.2d 196, 200 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1980); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F.
Supp. 1090, 1108 (E.D.N.C. 1984) ("Informal actions, if they reflect a general policy, custom,
practice or pattern of official conduct which even tacitly encourages conduct depriving individ-
uals of their constitutional rights satisfies section 1983 standards."); Popow v. City of Margate:
[R]egarding discipline of officers, the rule is that where a city's procedure of repri-
mand is so inadequate as to ratify unconstitutional conduct, the city may be liable
under section 1983. A police chief's persistent failure to discipline or control subor-
dinates in the face of knowledge of their propensity for improper use of force may
constitute an official custom or defacto policy, actionable under section 1983.
476 F. Supp. 1237, 1246-47 (D. N.J. 1979).
39. While Tuttle addresses the measure of proof required to sustain a finding of municipal
policy, 105 S. Ct. at 2436, it does not specifically address what level of pleading is required if
the plaintiff is to survive a municipal defendant's motion to dismiss. In light of the Court's
resolution, however, it seems clear that a complaint which alleges only one unconstitutional
incident will not survive a motion to dismiss.
[Vol. 13:733
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tutional rights; minimizing the burden on the municipality, as well as on
the federal courts, from numerous and potentially groundless suits; and
allowing the individual states to regulate their own affairs.' The tension
40. For those cases finding the interests of the plaintiff to be of primary concern, see Hirst
v. Gertzen, 676 F.2d 1252, 1263 (9th Cir. 1982) (a pleading which outlined a systematic failure
of officials to exercise minimal care in hiring and supervising a deputy was held to allege a
triable issue of fact); Murray v. City of Chicago, 634 F.2d 365, 367 (7th Cir. 1981) (a policy
may be inferred from allegations that "similar unwarranted arrests have occurred frequently,
to the knowledge of the parties involved"); Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242, 1246-47 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979) (an egregiously brutal, isolated incident of abuse by prison
guard was held sufficient to suggest official acquiescence); Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F.
Supp. 455, 460 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (pleadings should be liberally construed because the plaintiff
has limited access to discovery at the pleading stage); Scott v. Donovan, 539 F. Supp. 255
(N.D. Ga. 1982) (an allegation of a warrantless and malicious arrest states a cause of action
under section 1983); Leite v. City of Providence, 463 F. Supp. 585, 590 (D.R.I. 1978) ("the
city's citizens do not have to endure a 'pattern' of past police misconduct before they can sue
the city under section 1983").
By contrast, many cases found the potential burden on the municipality to be the para-
mount concern. See Strauss v. City of Chicago, 760 F.2d 765, 768-69 (7th Cir. 1985) (to prove
failure to discipline the police, the plaintiff must identify a statistical pattern of complaints filed
with the police department, explain why those prior arrests were illegal, and show a similar
illegality was involved in his or her case); Berry v. McLemore, 670 F.2d 30, 33 (5th Cir. 1982)
("a policy cannot be inferred from a municipality's isolated decision not to discipline a single
officer for a single incident of illegality"); Landrigan v. City of Warwick, 628 F.2d 736, 747
(Ist Cir. 1980) (an allegation of a single incident of mistreatment was insufficient in so far as
the record failed to indicate "whether any departmental or municipal investigation of the...
incident and its aftermath was ever undertaken or whether the officers were subjected to any
internal disciplinary proceedings"); Schramm v. Krischell, 84 F.R.D. 294, 298 (D. Conn.
1984) ("to bypass... [a] motion to dismiss ... the complaint must make reference in detail to
specific incidents of misconduct by government officials and must extrapolate from these inci-
dents to indicate the particular manner in which the governmental body, by omission or com-
mission, has placed its imprimatur upon the actions of its officers."); Smith v. Ambrogio, 456
F. Supp. 1130, 1137 (D. Conn. 1978) (particularized fact pleading required: "At a minimum
the pleader must specify the overt acts relied upon as a basis for the claim that a pattern of
unconstitutional actions exist and that the senior officials of the town knew of the unconstitu-
tional actions and encouraged their repetition by inaction.").
The requirement of a higher pleading threshold in section 1983 actions squarely contra-
dicts the liberal philosophy behind the federal rules. See Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46
(1957); FED. R. Civ. P. 8(a). The cases with rigid pleading requirements have justified their
departure from that philosophy based on the incapacitating effect unlimited suits would have
upon a municipality:
[A] claim of municipal liability based on an alleged policy reflected by a pattern of
prior episodes will inevitably risk placing an entire police department on trial.
Sweeping discovery will be sought to unearth episodes in which allegedly similar
unconstitutional actions have been taken, and the trial will then require litigation of
every episode occurring in the community that counsel believes can be shown to
involve a similar constitutional violation. Even if a trial of that scope is warranted by
a complaint that does allege overt acts with requisite particularity, neither a federal
court nor a municipality should be burdened with such an action unless a detailed
pleading is presented.
Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. at 1137 (citations omitted). Courts which heighten pleading
requirements presume that most section 1983 actions against municipalities will be frivolous,
brought only to reach the deep pockets of the government entity, and thereby inhibiting federal
Summer 1986]
HASTINGS CONSTITUTIONAL LAW QUARTERLY
between the competing interests is illustrated in two decisions of the
Northern District of Illinois. In Means v. City of Chicago,41 the court
stated:
[T]he test is not whether the plaintiff has pleaded factual instances
demonstrating that an unconstitutional policy exists, but rather
whether the policy, custom or practice, once pleaded, can be
proved.... We are at a loss as to how any plaintiff, including a
civil rights plaintiff, is supposed to allege with specificity prior to
discovery acts to which he or she personally was not exposed, but
which provide evidence necessary to sustain the plaintiff's claim,
i.e., that there was an official policy or a de facto custom which
violated the Constitution.42
Two years later, in Rodgers v. Lincoln Towing Service,43 the same court
asserted:
While paying lip service to the doctrine of Monell... [boilerplate
policy] allegations are now used to justify the addition of the mu-
nicipality as a defendant in virtually every section 1983 case
against individual municipal employees in a transparent attempt
to circumvent the Monell Court's explicit rejection of a respondeat
superior theory of municipal liability under section 1983. The mu-
nicipality can then be dragged into what one respected commenta-
tor has called "the swamp of discovery," in the hope that it will
capitulate or that by rooting through its records the plaintiff's law-
yer can unearth something to prop up his otherwise unsupported
hypothesis. Because of this enormous potential for abuse, a plain-
tiff wishing to assert such a claim must plead facts tending to show
a pattern of illegal conduct going beyond a single incident of
wrongdoing.
44
The different treatment accorded the two cases by the same court may be
explained by the facts of each case: Means involved a wrongful death
claim when policemen shot and killed an arrestee during the course of
the arrest,45 whereas in Rodgers, the plaintiff alleged false arrest with no
attendant misconduct by police officers.4 6 The standard of proof posited
by the court in Rodgers reflects the concerns articulated by the Court in
Tuttle.47
court access to those with legitimate claims. The law, however, authorizes federal courts to
impose sanctions for frivolous a~tions, including attorney's fees, which should serve as an ef-
fective deterrent. See FED. R. Civ. P. 11.
41. 535 F. Supp. 455 (N.D. Ill. 1982), aff'd, 771 F.2d 194 (7th Cir. 1985).
42. Id. at 459-60 (citations omitted).
43. 596 F. Supp. 13 (N.D. Ill. 1984).
44. Id. at 20. The court imposed sanctions on the attorney for bringing a frivolous action.
See supra note 40.
45. Means, 535 F. Supp. at 458.
46. Rodgers, 596 F. Supp. at 16.
47. See infra notes 65-79 and accompanying text.
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C. Rizzo v. Goode: The Need for a Causal Connection Between an
Official's Inaction and the Constitutional Violation
When a plaintiff sustains her action beyond the pleading stage and
can prove at trial that an unconstitutional municipal policy exists, she
must then show it was this policy which violated her constitutional
rights-the issue addressed in Rizzo v. Goode.4" In Rizzo, a pre-Monell
case, the plaintiffs instituted a class action suit against the Philadelphia
Mayor, Police Commissioner, and others, alleging a pattern of illegal and
unconstitutional treatment of minorities by members of the Philadelphia
police department. At trial, the plaintiffs proved twenty of the more than
forty alleged incidents of illegal and unconstitutional police conduct.49
The suit was initially brought for injunctive and declaratory relief, the
plaintiffs requesting the court to supervise the police department until
police conduct conformed to constitutional standards.5 0
The district court found the number of incidents of unconstitutional
police conduct to be "unacceptably high."51 Although the plaintiffs
failed to show that the city officials had knowledge of, or were directly
responsible for, the actions of the police officers, the court granted in-
junctive relief based on the officials' failure to act in response to a statisti-
cal pattern of unconstitutional police conduct.52
The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the petitioners could not
be liable for inaction when they were not "causally linked" to the proven
statistical pattern of police misconduct.5 3 The Court disagreed with the
district court's finding that twenty incidents of unconstitutional conduct,
within the span of a year, was "unacceptably high," because the incidents
"occurr[ed] at large in a city of three million inhabitants, with 7,500 po-
licemen,""4 and "there was no showing that the behavior of the Philadel-
phia police was different in kind or degree from that which exists
elsewhere."55
The application of Rizzo by the lower courts has proven inconsis-
tent. While under Rizzo the municipal policy must be a "moving force"
behind the constitutional violation,56 the federal courts are split on
48. 423 U.S. 362 (1976).
49. Id. at 366-68.
50. 506 F.2d 542, 545 (3d Cir. 1974).
51. 423 U.S. at 375.
52. Id. at 373, 375-76.
53. Id. at 375.
54. Id. at 373.
55. Id. at 375. As the Court noted, the district court found "the problems disclosed by
the record ... [to be] fairly typical of [those] afflicting police departments in major urban
areas."Id.
56. See Polk County v. Dodson, 454 U.S. 312, 326-27 (1981) (citing Monell, 436 U.S. at
694).
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whether that causal link can be inferred solely from an official's failure to
act.
In Lewis v. Hyland,57 for example, the plaintiffs sought injunctive
relief against the New Jersey state police and troopers, to quell their al-
leged "pattern and practice" of illegally stopping and searching "long-
haired highway travelers."58 The plaintiffs introduced evidence of sixty-
six incidents, thirty-four of which involved constitutional violations. The
Third Circuit denied relief, based on the plaintiffs' failure to prove a
causal connection between the unconstitutional acts of the individual of-
ficers, and the officials' failure to take remedial action, as required by
Rizzo. The court held: "Plaintiffs' evidence here demonstrated at most
an unfortunate insensitivity on the part of responsible officials towards
reports of abuses by individual troopers."5 9 Such insensitivity, the court
continued, "extended in several instances to departmental awards being
conferred upon individual troopers, named as defendants here, for their
performance during the very time in which they instituted flagrantly ille-
gal searches."6 Notwithstanding this evidence, the court concluded that
the police "insensitivity" was not the result of a conscious choice by state
officials to encourage unconstitutional conduct, and thus relief was
denied.61
In contrast, the Second Circuit, in Owens v. Haas,62 held that one
brutal incident of unconstitutional conduct would suffice to prove that a
municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional viola-
tion.6 3 In Owens, the plaintiff, a federal prisoner, was beaten by several
57. 554 F.2d 93 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 931 (1978).
58. Id. at 95.
59. Id. at 101 (emphasis added).
60. Id. at 101 n.21.
61. Id. at 101.
62. 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 980 (1979).
63. Id. at 1246. In allowing a single incident of police misconduct to establish that the
municipal policy was the moving force behind the constitutional violation, the Second Circuit
is nonetheless consistent with the federal rule that, absent exceptional circumstances, a causal
link cannot be inferred from inaction alone. Compare Owens, id., with Smith v. Ambrogio, 456
F. Supp. 1130, 1136 (D. Conn. 1978):
What Rizzo requires when a supervisor is held liable for failure to prevent continua-
tion of a pattern of prior unconstitutional episodes is that the supervisor be "causally
linked" to the pattern. 423 U.S. at 375. There are surely intimations in Rizzo that
this causal link cannot be inferred from inaction alone. If such a case can be stated
after Rizzo, it must present such extreme facts that inaction by a supervisor with
knowledge of a pattern of unconstitutional actions by his subordinates is the
equivalent of approval of the pattern as a policy of the supervisor and hence tacit
encouragement that the pattern continue. Plainly that will not be an easy standard
to meet.
See also Duchesne v. Sugarman, 566 F.2d 817, 831 (2d Cir. 1977) (court distinguished between
an official's "failure to act in the face of misconduct by subordinates" and an official's "affirma-
tive policy-making which may have caused the misconduct," suggesting that the failure to act




county prison officers when he refused to leave his cell. The court stated
that "[w]hile some causal link must be made between the county's failure
to train and the violation of constitutional rights, a single brutal incident
... may be sufficent to suggest that link." 6  As noted below, Tuttle ex-
plicitly rejects the approach taken in Owens, thereby increasing the evi-
dentiary burden on the section 1983 plaintiff at the pleading stage.
III. Tuttle's Reshaping of the Municipal Liability Standard
under Section 1983
A. The Decision
The Tuttle Court reviewed the evidence presented to the jury, and
the jury instructions given by the trial judge,65 to determine whether the
jury's finding of municipal liability was warranted.
1. The Plurality Opinion
The plurality opinion, written by Justice Rehnquist and joined by
Chief Justice Burger and Justices O'Connor and White, 66 began with a
summary of Monell's municipal "policy" standard of liability.67 The
plurality then distinguished Monell on the basis that the city officials in
that case took affirmative steps in promulgating the challenged municipal
policy,68 whereas in Tuttle, the municipal policy was to be inferred from
the city officials' inaction-the failure to adequately train the police
force.69 Focusing on this distinction, the Tuttle plurality questioned (1)
whether a policy which is not unconstitutional on its face, such as the
failure to provide adequate training for municipal employees, "can ever
64. 601 F.2d at 1246.
65. See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
66. Justice Powell did not participate in the decision.
67. 105 S. Ct. 2427, 2429 (1985).
68. Id. at 2435-36. See, eg., Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986) (mu-
nicipal policy can be inferred from a municipal official's single decision which affected a single
person).
69. Throughout the opinion, the plurality distinguished the municipal policy of inaction
sought to be proven in Tuttle, from the type of policy involved in Monell, apparently fearing
the prospect that a municipality could be haled into court each time a nonpolicymaking em-
ployee, such as a police officer, violated a person's constitutional rights. In demonstrating the
subjectivity of a policy of "inaction," the plurality observed:
[S]ome limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability through policies
that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set out in Monell will become a
dead letter. Obviously, if one retreats far enough from a constitutional violation
some municipal "policy" can be identified behind almost any such harm inflicted by
a municipal official; for example, Rotramel would never have killed Tuttle if
Oklahoma City did not have a "policy" of establishing a police force.
105 S. Ct. at 2436. See also infra text accompanying note 73.
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meet the 'policy' requirement of Monell,' '70 and (2) whether under Mo-
nell 'gross negligence' in establishing police training practices could es-
tablish a 'policy' ... or whether a more conscious decision on the part of
the policymaker would be required."
7'
Without resolving these issues, the Tuttle plurality held, as a matter
of law, that a municipal policy of inadequate training could never be
inferred from a single incident of excessive force:
Proof of a single incident of unconstitutional activity is not suffi-
cient to impose liability under Monell, unless proof of the incident
includes proof that it was caused by an existing, unconstitutional
municipal policy, which policy can be attributed to a municipal
policymaker. Otherwise the existence of the unconstitutional pol-
icy, and its origin, must be separately proved. But where the pol-
icy relied upon is not itself unconstitutional, considerably more
proof than the single incident will be necessary in every case to
establish both the requisite fault on the part of the municipality,
and the causal connection between the "policy" and the unconsti-
tutional deprivation.72
2. The Concurring Opinion
Justice Brennan, joined by Justices Marshall and Blackmun, wrote a
concurring opinion in which he addressed the requirements of pleading
and proof under section 1983.73 The concurring justices agreed with the
plurality that if a municipal policy could be inferred solely from an un-
70. 105 S. Ct. at 2436 n.7 (emphasis added). Another example of a facially constitutional
municipal policy is when an official fails to discipline a subordinate police officer who over-
stepped his or her constitutional authority (e.g., by using excessive force to effectuate an
arrest). The municipal "policy" is the city's failure to take disciplinary action, which implic-
itly condones the unconstitutional action. See, e.g., Herrerra v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th
Cir. 1981); Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090 (E.D.N.C. 1984). Such a policy, which is not
in itself unconstitutional, can be contrasted to an articulated policy of the city, such as that in
Monell, which compelled all pregnant city employees to leave their jobs at a specified point in
their pregnancy, notwithstanding their ability to continue working. 436 U.S. 658, 660-61
(1978). The policy in Monell was held facially unconstitutional, and the Court held one appli-
cation of the policy by the municipality was sufficient to prove the policy's existence. 436 U.S.
at 694-95.
71. 105 S. Ct. at 2436 n.7. The Court withheld opinion on these two issues, but its line of
questioning reveals the path which the Rehnquist Court may follow in the future. Recently, in
Davidson v. Cannon, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986), the Court held that a prison guard's negligence or
lack of due care does not give rise to municipal liability under section 1983: "[Where a gov-
ernment official is merely negligent in causing the injury, no procedure for compensation is
constitutionally required." 106 S. Ct. at 670. See also Daniels v. Williams, 106 S. Ct. 662
(1986).
72. 105 S. Ct. at 2436 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).
73. Justice Brennan summarized the elements of a section 1983 action as follows: "The
plaintiff must prove that (1) a person (2) acting under color of state law (3) subjected the
plaintiff or caused the plaintiff to be subjected (4) to the deprivation of a right secured by the
Constitution or laws of the United States." Id. at 2439 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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constitutional act committed by a nonpolicymaking municipal employee,
a jury could impose liability on the municipality on the basis of respon-
deat superior, a theory expressly rejected in Monell.74 The concurrence,
however, rejected the plurality's implication that the first victim of un-
constitutional police activity could not-whereas subsequent victims
could-obtain a remedy from the responsible municipality under section
1983:
A rule that the city should be entitled to its first constitutional vio-
lation without incurring liability-even where the first incident was
the taking of the life of an innocent citizen-would be a legal
anomaly, unsupported by the legislative history or policies under-
lying section 1983. A section 1983 cause of action is as available
for the first victim of a policy or custom that would foreseeably and
avoidably cause an individual to be subjected to deprivation of a
constitutional right as it is for the second and subsequent victims;
by exposing a municipal defendant to liability on the occurrence of
the first incident, it is hoped that future incidents will not occur. 75
The concurring justices also rejected the plurality's distinction between
policies that are unconstitutional per se, and policies which must be in-
ferred from a municipal official's failure to act:
I do not understand, nor do I see the necessity for, the metaphysi-
cal distinction between policies that are themselves unconstitu-
tional and those that cause constitutional violations. . . . If a
municipality takes actions-whether they be of the type alleged in
Monell... or this case-that cause the deprivation of a citizen's
constitutional rights, section 1983 is available as a remedy.7 6
3. The Dissenting Opinion
Justice Stevens was the sole dissenter in Tuttle. Construing the lan-
guage of section 1983, which does not contain the word "policy," he ar-
gued that Monell's "policy" analysis is merely dicta, and that a plaintiff
should be able to state a section 1983 cause of action against a municipal-
ity on the basis of respondeat superior. 7 Justice Stevens maintained that
"[t]he interest in providing fair compensation for the victim, the interest
in deterring future violations by formulating sound municipal policy, and
the interest in fair treatment for individual officers who are performing
difficult and dangerous work, all militate in favor of placing primary re-
sponsibility on the municipal corporation. '78 Justice Stevens concluded
that this construction of section 1983 would best effectuate Congress' in-
74. Id. at 2440, 2441 n.7.
75. Id. at 2440-41.
76. Id. at 2441 n.8.
77. Id. at 2445 (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("If the doctrine of respondeat superior would
impose liability on the city in an ordinary tort case, afortiori, that doctrine must apply to the
city in a section 1983 case.").
78. Id. at 2447 (footnotes omitted).
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tent in enacting the remedial statute.79
B. The Ramifications of Tuttle's Municipal "Policy" Standard
The rule of law announced in Tuttle should be limited to the state-
ment that a single incident of unconstitutional police conduct is insuffi-
cient by itself to prove an official policy for purposes of municipal
liability under section 1983.80 If the plurality opinion is thus construed,
Tuttle will most notably impact the section 1983 plaintiff's evidentiary
burden. After Tuttle, a section 1983 plaintiff will bear a heavier burden
to plead and prove prior instances of police misconduct, and, when inad-
equate training of municipal employees is alleged, to produce expert tes-
timony on the inadequacy of the police training curriculum.81 The dicta
in Tuttle, however, has broad implications regarding the viability of the
current standards under Monell and Rizzo.
L An official's Failure to Act as Municipal Policy
In Monell, the Court identified two types of municipal "policy": of-
ficial action and official inaction. Official action, based on an articulated
or written rule promulgated by municipal decision-making channels, is
easily proven.82 In Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati,83 the Court reaffirmed
that a single decision of a municipal official can constitute municipal pol-
icy for purposes of imposing liability on the municipality. 4 Official inac-
tion, however, is inherently more nebulous and difficult to prove. It must
be inferred from an official's failure to act, such as failing to discipline an
officer who engaged in wrongful conduct, or failing to adequately train
and supervise members of a police force.
The Monell Court included official inaction in its municipal policy
standard of liability with the recognition that, although municipalities
formally draft their policies to comport with constitutional standards, in
practice these policies may be abused or disregarded by municipal em-
ployees.85 Abusive practices or "customs" fail to pass constitutional
79. See supra notes 21-24 and accompanying text.
80. 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
81. Id.
82. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. See also Fann v. City of Cleveland, 616 F. Supp. 305, 313
(N.D. Ohio 1985) (policy of strip searching motorists who violated traffic laws held facially
unconstitutional upon evidence of one application of the policy).
83. 106 S. Ct. 1292 (1986).
84. Id. at 1299-1300. In Pembaur, the plaintiff, a licensed physician, was indicted by a
grand jury on various counts of fraud. When Dr. Pembaur barred entry into his medical clinic
to Deputy Sheriffs seeking to serve capiases on two of Dr. Pembaur's employees, the Assistant
Prosecutor authorized the Deputy Sheriffs to "go in and get [the witnesses]." Id. at 1294-95.
Acting on this instruction, city police officers broke down the door to the clinic with an axe,
and the Deputy Sheriffs entered. Id. at 1295.
85. For example, police officers, as a matter of "custom," may use excessive force in effec-
tuating arrests. See, e.g., Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981).
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muster, even though the "official" municipal policy is facially constitu-
tional. When an official has knowledge of unlawful employee customs,
yet fails to take remedial action,16 these customs "have the force of law"
and are attributable to the municipality as official policy. 7
The Tuttle plurality deviated substantially from Monell's directive
by questioning whether official inaction can ever constitute municipal
policy,8 8 and by positing an unduly restrictive definition of "policy":
To establish the constitutional violation in Monell no evidence was
needed other than a statement of the policy by the municipal cor-
poration, and its exercise; but the type of "policy" upon which re-
spondent relies, and its causal relation to the alleged constitutional
violation, are not susceptible to such easy proof. In the first place,
the word "policy" generally implies a course of action consciously
chosen from among various alternatives; it is therefore difficult in
one sense even to accept the submission that someone pursues a
"policy" of "inadequate training," unless evidence be adduced
which proves that the inadequacies resulted from conscious
choice-that is, proof that the policymakers deliberately chose a
training program which would prove inadequate.8 9
The above language reflects the plurality's reluctance to impose liability
on a municipality when an official fails to take action to remedy the un-
constitutional practices of police officers.
The plurality justified its restrictive approach by admonishing that
"some limitation must be placed on establishing municipal liability
through policies that are not themselves unconstitutional, or the test set
out in Monell will become a dead letter."9 ° Although in accord with
Monell there must be limits on when a municipality can be held liable for
the unconstitutional acts of its police officers, the plurality's approach
gives license to the lower courts to absolve a municipality of liability
when its policies are facially constitutional, but unconstitutionally imple-
mented. 91 Such a result would be wholly inconsistent with Monell and
with the Congressional intent in enacting section 1983, which was to pro-
vide a federal remedy for invidious state practices.92 To immunize a mu-
nicipality from liability for invidious practices when the articulated
86. For example, the official may institute an investigation of the alleged misconduct, or
take disciplinary measures against the culpable police officer. See, eg., Turpin v. Mailet, 619
F.2d 196 (2d Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1016 (1981); Popow v. City of Margate, 476 F.
Supp. 1237 (D. N.J. 1979).
87. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. See supra text accompanying note 36.
88. 105 S. Ct. at 2436.
89. Id. (footnote omitted).
90. Id.
91. A municipality should not be permitted to avoid liability for constitutional violations
simply because it has a written or articulated policy which is facially constitutional, when that
policy is not adhered to in practice. See Schnapper, Civil Rights Litigation After Monell, 79
COLUM. L. Rav. 213, 231 (1979).
92. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173-74. See supra text accompanying notes 22-24.
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policy is facially constitutional, is a futile exercise of form over
substance.
93
Moreover, by absolving a municipality of liability when a plaintiff
can prove only one instance of unconstitutional conduct, or one uncon-
stitutional application of an offical policy, the Court arbitrarily denies a
section 1983 remedy to a large class of plaintiffs-the first victims of an
unconstitutional municipal policy ratified by municipal officials' inac-
tion.94 Although the Court may have policy reasons95 for denying a fed-
eral remedy to those plaintiffs injured by the "inaction" of an official
policymaker, while granting relief to those plaintiffs injured by the af-
firmative action of that policymaker, there is no constitutional basis for
such a distinction.96 For the injured party, as well, there is no distinction
between the harm caused by official "action" versus official "inaction."
93. Many lower courts have narrowly construed this aspect of Tuttle. See, e.g., Fiacco v.
City of Rensselaer, 783 F.2d 319, 326-27 (2d Cir. 1986) (a municipal policy which is not
facially unconstitutional can be the basis for a section 1983 cause of action); Kibbe v. City of
Springfield, 777 F.2d 801 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. granted, 106 S. Ct. 1374 (1986) (despite Tuttle's
implications, a policy of municipal inaction is still within the purview of section 1983); Grand-
staff v. City of Borger, 767 F.2d 161 (5th Cir. 1985) (the plaintiff's complaint, which alleged
gross neglect of officials after the brutal beating of the plaintiff by several officers, was held to
state a cause of action under section 1983); Jamieson v. Shaw, 772 F.2d 1205 (5th Cir. 1985)
(the plaintiff stated a cause of action for official inaction-inadequate training); Rymer v.
Davis, 775 F.2d 756 (6th Cir. 1985) (the plaintiff's complaint stated a cause of action for
injuries which were the result of inadequate police training); Fundiller v. City of Cooper City,
777 F.2d 1436, 1442-43 (11th Cir. 1985) (the court stated that it may be "questionable"
whether official inaction can form the basis for municipal liability after Tuttle, but the plaintiff
may state a cause of action by alleging official acquiesence to police officers' use of excessive
force); Loza v. Lynch, 625 F. Supp. 850 (D. Conn. 1986) (the plaintiff stated a cause of action
against the city when the city failed to take disciplinary action against a single officer); Bynum
v. City of Pittsburg, 622 F. Supp. 196, 201 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (the plaintiffs stated a cause of
action by alleging an "ongoing policy of inadequate training which caused their son's death
and involved the injuries and deaths of other minorities").
However, many federal district courts still impose strict pleading requirements after Tut-
tie. See, e.g., Camarano v. City of New York, 624 F. Supp. 1144 (S.D.N.Y. 1986); York v.
City of San Pablo, 621 F. Supp. 34 (N.D. Cal. 1985); Titus v. Newton Township, 621 F. Supp
754 (E.D. Pa. 1985); Bibbo v. Mulhern, 621 F. Supp. 1018 (D. Mass. 1985); Garcia v. Wyck-
off, 615 F. Supp. 217 (D. Colo. 1985).
94. Tuttle creates a classic dog-bite situation: the second victim to be "bitten" by an
unconstitutional municipal policy is able to state a section 1983 action, while the first victim is
precluded from doing so. If the legislature were to promulgate such a scheme, the scheme
would run counter to the equal protection component of the Fifth Amendment Due Process
Clause. See Bolling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954) (unlike the Fourteenth Amendment, which
applies to the states, the Fifth Amendment, which applies to the federal government, does not
expressly contain an Equal Protection Clause; the Supreme Court held that the Due Process
Clause of the Fifth Amendment impliedly contains an equal protection component); J. No-
WAK, R. ROTUNDA & J. YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 519 (1977); Tussman & tenBroek,
The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAL. L. Rnv. 341 (1949).
95. For example, the concern for overcrowded court dockets. See Kupfer, supra note 8.
96. Whether the unconstitutional activity results from official action or inaction, the net
result is the same: the violation of the victim's constitutional rights. Compare Monell, 436
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The ramifications of an official's failure to rectify police misconduct, such
as the perpetuation of discrimination against a certain ethnic or minority
group, 9 7 can be more insidious and socially harmful than an articulated
policy, which is formally drafted so as not to have a disparate impact on
a county's citizens. Given the difficulties of proving official inaction, the
federal courts should help facilitate the fact finding process in an effort to
protect federal constitutional rights from state encroachment. 98
2. The Causation Requirement
Tuttle's impact on the Rizzo requirement that a municipal policy be
causally related to the constitutional violation, is to raise the plaintiff's
burden of proof. When the municipal policy alleged is facially constitu-
tional, the Court held that "considerably more proof than the single inci-
dent will be necessary in every case to establish.., the causal connection
between the 'policy' and the constitutional deprivation." 99 Tuttle re-
quires the plaintiff to show, at the very least, an "affirmative link between
the policy and the particular constitutional violation alleged. ' '""o In for-
mulating this standard, the Court expressed its concern that municipal
liability not be imposed when an official's action, or inaction, is attenu-
ated from the misconduct of a nonpolicymaking employee. 101
IV. Federalism, Due Process, and the Inadequacy of State
Court Remedies
The Supreme Court's concern for federalism and the proper scope of
section 1983 has shaped both its definition of the conduct which rises to
the level of a constitutional tort,"°2 and its development of due process
U.S. 658 (1978) (official action), with Owens v. Haas, 601 F.2d 1242 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 980 (1979) (official inaction).
97. Cf. Herrera v. Valentine, 653 F.2d 1220 (8th Cir. 1981) (systematic mistreatment of
Indian residents). Unconstitutional police activity tends to fall disproportionately on minority
groups. See Stormer & Bernstein, The Impact of Kolender v. Lawson on Law Enforcement and
Minority Groups, 12 HASTINGS CONsT. L.Q. 105 (1984).
98. See Durchslag, Federalism and Constitutional Liberties: Varying the Remedy to Save
the Right, 54 N.Y.U. L. REv. 723, 732 (1979).
99. 105 S. Ct. at 2436 (footnote omitted). The Court is silent regarding the quantum of
evidence which a plaintiff must introduce to meet the criteria of "considerably more proof"
than one incident of unconstitutional conduct.
100. Id. at 2436, 2436-37 n.8.
101. Id. at 2435, 2436; id. at 2440 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. While it is clear that to pursue an action under section 1983, a person must suffer the
deprivation of a constitutional right (Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979)), there is
some debate as to what type of police misconduct will rise to the level of a "constitutional
tort." See Whitman, supra note 7; Friedman, Parratt v. Taylor: Opening and Closing the Door
on Section 1983, 9 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 545 (1982). Some courts caution that "assault and
battery do not become violations of the Fourteenth Amendment merely because the defendant
is a city police officer" (Spell v. McDaniel, 591 F. Supp. 1090, 1100 (E.D.N.C. 1984) (citations
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analysis in police misconduct cases. 10 3
Federalism, the doctrine invoked to preserve state sovereignty
against encroachment by the federal government, calls for federal absten-
tion from areas historically within the control or direction of the
states. 1"4 In Younger v. Harris,105 Justice Black wrote:
What [federalism] . . . represent[s] is a system in which there is
sensitivity to the legitimate interests of both State and National
Governments, and in which the National Government, anxious
though it may be to vindicate and protect federal rights and federal
interests, always endeavors to do so in ways that will not unduly
interfere with legitimate activities of the States.16
The role of section 1983 litigation within this backdrop can be under-
stood by examining the history of the section 1983 remedial scheme.
With the passage of the Ku Klux Klan Act in 1871, Congress determined
omitted)), yet others deem the misconduct of government officers, as opposed to private citi-
zens, to have graver implications on constitutionally protected rights. See, e.g., Wellington v.
Daniels, 717 F.2d 932 (4th Cir. 1982) (a child struck on the head by a police officer's flashlight
suffered complete body paralysis and severe reduction in mental capacity). The Wellington
court stated:
The type of serious injury inflicted by a member of the... police force does not by its
very nature, of itself, give it constitutional stature. Nevertheless there is a distinction
between conduct by state actors and private citizens. Therefore, legitimate concerns
with stemming the federalization of common law tort actions must not subvert a
court's duty to safeguard legitimate constitutional rights.
Id. at 935. See also Howse v. DeBerry Correctional Inst., 537 F. Supp. 1177, 1181 (M.D.
Tenn. 1982) (to rise to the level of a constitutional tort, the government agent's actions must
have been "sufficiently egregious").
Under the Fourth Amendment, the Supreme Court in Bivens v. Six Unknown Named
Agents of the Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971), noted that "power, once
granted, does not disappear like a magic gift when it is wrongfully used. An agent acting-
albeit unconstitutionally-in the name of the United States possesses a far greater capacity for
harm than an individual trespasser exercising no authority other than his own .... " The same
rationale should afford protection, vis-a-vis a comprehensive remedy, to victims of police mis-
conduct. See generally Friedman, supra, at 573-75; Note, A Theory of Negligence for Constitu-
tional Torts, 92 YALE L. J. 683, 698 (1983).
103. See infra notes 111-130 and accompanying text.
104. See generally, Scheiber, Federalism and the Constitution: The Original Understanding,
in AMERICAN LAW AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER 85 (L. Friedman & H. Scheiber eds.
1978).
105. 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
106. Id. at 44. The demarcation between the spheres of federal and state power is fluid:
The proper balance of state and national powers, Woodrow Wilson wrote in 1911, is
not a matter that can be settled "by the opinion of any one generation." Changing
conditions and the perceptions of social need, transformations of political values, and
the lessons of time will serve, he contended, to make federal-state relationships "a
new question" subject to reconsideration by each successive generation.
Scheiber, Some Realism About Federalism: Historical Complexities and Current Challenges,
from EMERGING ISSUES IN AMERICAN FEDERALISM, ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON INTERGOV-
ERNMENTAL RELATIONS 41 (1976). The Tuttle plurality's concept of federalism is to give
primacy to state autonomy over the concern for the vindication of an individual's constitution-
ally guaranteed rights. See supra notes 65-72, 88-93 and accompanying text.
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that when a person acting under color of state law violates an individ-
ual's constitutional rights, the victim is to be afforded a remedy in federal
court, notwithstanding the existence of an adequate state law remedy. ' 7
While under the original scheme of the Constitution, the state courts
were "the primary guarantors of constitutional rights,"' 8 after the Civil
War "[t]he assumption was abandoned that the state courts were the nor-
mal place for enforcement of federal law save in rare and narrow in-
stances where they affirmatively demonstrated themselves unfit or
unfair."' 9 This dual remedial scheme reflects Congress' belief that the
federal courts are the best forum for the adjudication of rights protected
by the Constitution." '
The Burger Court departed from Congress' original intent in a series
of due process decisions which abrogated the section 1983 remedy in
favor of state adjudication of constitutional rights. For example, in Paul
v. Davis,"' the police wrongfully published the plaintiff's name and pic-
ture on a list identifying "active shoplifters," and distributed it to local
merchants." 2 The Court in Paul declined to find a constitutionally pro-
tected liberty or property interest in a person's reputation, thereby limit-
ing the claimant to a state tort action for defamation.' 3 As Professor
Monaghan posited, when the Supreme Court desires to limit the process
due under the Fourteenth Amendment, it will define an interest so as not
to be a protected life, liberty, or property interest, and therefore not a
107. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183; supra notes 22-25 and accompanying text; see also
Smolla, The Displacement of Federal Due Process Claims by State Tort Remedies: Parratt v.
Taylor and Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Company, 1982 U. ILL. L. F. 831; Note, Developments
in the Law: Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARv. L. Rlv. 1133, 1164 (1977) [hereinafter
cited as Note, Section 1983].
108. Hart, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts: An Exer-
cise in Dialectic, 66 HARV. L. RPv. 1362, 1401 (1953). See also Redish & Woods, Congres-
sional Power to Control the Jurisdiction of Lower Federal Courts: A Critical Review and a New
Synthesis, 124 U. PA. L. Rav. 45, 52-56 (1975) (history of the compromise struck at the Con-
stitutional Convention between those favoring no lower federal courts (and thus state adjudica-
tion of federal rights) and those favoring mandatory establishment of lower federal courts (and
thus federal adjudication of federal rights)).
109. Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: Fed-
eral Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. PA. L. REv.
793, 828 (1965); Note, Section 1983, supra note 109, at 1152-53 ("because of 'the unreliable
behavior of the state courts during the war and their evident susceptibility to local pressures,
the courts that the Republicans turned to were the federal trial courts.' ").
110. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 180, and supra text accompanying note 25; see also Note, A
Theory of Negligence, supra note 102, at 92; Friedman, supra note 102, at 573-75. But cf
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 238-45 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (Congress, in enacting section 1983,
arguably did not intend to replace state tort law with federal remedies whenever the tortfeasor
was employed by a public body); Durchslag, supra note 98, at 734-42; Whitman, supra note 7,
at 36-37 (it is important that state courts set standards for local police officers).
111. 424 U.S. 693 (1976).
112. Id. at 695.
113. ird. at 712.
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federal issue.114
The Court again deferred to the state's authority in Ingraham v.
Wright.11 In Ingraham, the practice of Florida public school teachers
and officials of rendering disciplinary corporal punishment against stu-
dents was challenged as a denial of the students' procedural due process
rights. The Court held that although the students had a constitutionally
protected liberty interest, due process did not require prior notice and an
opportunity to be heard when an adequate common law postdeprivation
remedy was available. 16 Justices White and Stevens dissented, arguing
that a state postdeprivation remedy does not provide adequate due pro-
cess when liberty interests are jeopardized.
11 7
Finally, in Parratt v. Taylor,1 8 a state prison inmate brought a sec-
tion 1983 action to recover the value of a mailhobby kit lost by prison
officials who failed to follow formal procedures for receiving mail pack-
ages. The Court held that where there is an adequate state postdepriva-
tion remedy, the violation of a constitutionally protected property
interest is not actionable under section 1983, because the state procedure
afforded the individual "due process." 1 9 Comparing the adequacy of
state postdeprivation remedies with the federal remedy under section
1983, the Parratt Court stated: "Although the state remedies may not
provide the respondent with all the relief which may have been available
if he could have proceeded under section 1983, that does not mean that
the state remedies are not adequate to satisfy the requirements of due
process."120 The Court's overriding concern was that plaintiffs would
turn "every alleged injury which may have been infficted by a state offical
acting under 'color of law' into a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment
cognizable under section 1983. ' ' 121 Justice Blackmun, concurring, lim-
ited the Parratt decision to cases involving property interests, as opposed
to life or liberty interests, 22 despite the Court's prior holding in Ingra-
ham that state postdeprivation remedies were sufficient to redress the
deprivation of liberty interests.
114. See Monaghan, Of "Liberty" and "Property", 62 CORN. L. REv. 401, 429 (1977)
("Rather than facing the balancing question at the merits stage, the Court struck a compro-
mise at the definitional stage.").
115. 430 U.S. 651 (1977).
116. Id. at 672.
117. Id. at 701 (Stevens, J., dissenting). "[The common law] tort action is utterly inade-
quate to protect against erroneous infliction of punishment.... The infliction of physical pain
is final and irreparable; it cannot be undone in a subsequent proceeding." Id. at 693-95
(white, J., dissenting).
118. 451 U.S. 527 (1981), overruled in part, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986).
119. Id. at 543-44.
120. Id. at 544.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 545 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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There are several inconsistencies in the Court's resolution of Paul,
Ingraham, and Parratt. First, by relegating constitutional claims to state
tort actions, the Court defied the purpose and limited the scope of
Monroe's directive that section 1983 is supplementary to state law reme-
dies.'1 3 Second, the court treads on procedural due process guarantees.
The fundamental requirements of due process are notice and an opportu-
nity to be heard.'24 In the context of police misconduct, where life and
liberty interests are implicated, notice is impracticable and therefore the
constitutional onus is placed on the postdeprivation hearing.' z5
Addressing the due process issue, the Court's decision in Cleveland
Board of Education v. Loudermill'26 reverses the trend of Paul, Ingra-
ham, and Parratt. In Loudermill, two civil service employees were dis-
charged according to civil service procedures: with notice but without an
opportunity to respond to the charges levied against them. The Court
ruled that once a constitutionally protected interest is conferred by the
state, it is the role of the Federal Constitution, and not the state legisla-
ture, to define what process is due." 7 Under Loudermill, then, the states
may develop a compensation system for the harm inflicted by state of-
ficers, provided those state procedures satisfy federal constitutional
standards. 128
The analysis in Loudermill can be applied to the situation where
police officers deprive citizens of their life or liberty in violation of the
Fourteenth Amendment. Given the Court's inclination to relegate vic-
tims of police misconduct to state forums, the constitutional sufficiency
of state court relief becomes crucial.
When evaluating the adequacy of the state courts to vindicate fed-
eral constitutional rights, a distinction must be drawn between life and
liberty interests, on the one hand, and property, on the other.'2 9
Whereas the value of lost property can easily be restored through a
123. See Monroe, 365 U.S. at 183.
124. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950). Procedural
due process analysis entails a two-pronged test. First, the plaintiff's claim must implicate a
constitutionally protected interest: life, liberty or property. Second, if the court identifies a
protected entitlement, it must then determine what process is due. Board of Regents v. Roth,
408 U.S. 64 (1972). If a protected entitlement is not recognized, the court's inquiry ends. Cf
Van Alstyne, Cracks in "The New Property": Adjudicative Due Process in the Administrative
State, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 445, 489-90 (1977).
125. For the process to be adequate within the mandate of the Fourteenth Amendment, the
postdeprivation hearing must be procedurally "fair." NOWAK, supra note 94, at 477, 478-514.
126. 105 S. Ct. 1487 (1985).
127. Id. at 1493.
128. Id. ("The right to due process 'is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitu-
tional guarantee. .. .'" (citations omitted)). See Durchslag supra note 98, at 724-25; Smolla,
supra note 107.
129. See Ingraham, 430 U.S. at 694-701 (White, J., and Stevens, J., dissenting); Rosenberg,
Ingraham v. Wright: The Supreme Court's Whipping Boy, 78 COLUM. L. REv. 75, 76-79
(1978) (postdeprivation remedies cannot adequately compensate victims for loss of life or lib-
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postdeprivation state remedy, 130 life and liberty are constitutionally more
significant and more highly valued than property interests, and the depri-
vation of life or liberty is of a permanent and monetarily immeasurable
nature.131 Although the states have a legitimate interest in adjudicating
claims of dereliction by municipal officials and police officers, the federal
interest in vindicating constitutional rights is more compelling.
State adjudication of municipal liability claims enables the states to:
(1) protect individual liberties; (2) set their own standards for the regula-
tion of police behavior; and (3) make substantive common law contribu-
tions to the development of federal law.1 32 Additionally, adjudication of
constitutional torts in state forums may substantially reduce the federal
caseload. 133
However compelling the state interests may be in theory, the federal
interests, in practice, are paramount. First, section 1983 enables the fed-
eral courts, including the Supreme Court, to pass upon the constitution-
ality of local police practices. As suggested by Professor Amsterdam, the
only vehicle for the Supreme Court to review police practices is through
the exclusionary rule in the law of criminal procedure.13 4 Without an
avenue of review via section 1983, the Supreme Court cannot develop a
comprehensive scheme regarding criminal suspect's rights.1 35 Because
there is a paucity of legislation governing this area, 136 local norms and
practices must prevail. Federal judges, removed from state political pres-
sures and possible state bias, 137 may be more willing to utilize section
1983 as a "watchdog on abuses of power by state officers," 1 38 and there-
fore eradicate abuses committed at the local level.
Second, federal courts retain primary responsibility for, and federal
judges are more attuned to, the protection and vindication of constitu-
erty, as they can for loss of property). But cf Smolla, supra note 113, at 850; Kirby, Demoting
14th Amendment Claims to State Torts, 68 A.B.A. J. 166, 170-71 (1982).
130. See Parratt, 451 U.S. 527 (1981).
131. See Rosenberg, supra note 129.
132. Whitman, supra note 7, at 35-38.
133. Id. at 40. See supra note 44, for statistics on the increase of section 1983 suits brought
in federal courts.
134. Amsterdam, The Supreme Court and the Rights of Suspects in Criminal Cases, 45
N.Y.U. L. REV. 785, 787 (1970).
135. Id. at 787-88.
136. Id. at 790-91.
137. California voters recently enacted Proposition 51, The Fair Responsibility Act of
1986, into law. 1986 Cal. Legis. Serv. 6 (West). The statute is designed to limit a defendant's
potential tort liability for the non-economic losses suffered by a plaintiff (such as pain and
suffering), to the percentage of fault attributable to that individual defendant. See generally,
PEYRAT, PROPOSITION 51: A FIRST ANALYSIS (CEB Supp. 1986). The overwhelming victory
of the measure may be reflected in the state courts by an inhospitable climate towards plaintiffs
seeking redress from municipal defendants.
138. Friedman, supra note 102, at 575-76.
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tional rights.139 By analogy to the Supreme Court, which is traditionally
perceived as the "last resort" guardian of individual liberties,14 ° the
lower federal courts perform a similar function on a local level by pro-
tecting individuals from the action, and inaction, of municipal policy-
makers. Additionally, a fundamental guarantee of due process is the
uniform application of constitutional principles. Consistent application
of constitutional principles depends, in turn, on the competence of the
judiciary. As early as 1821, the Supreme Court recognized that federal
judges interpret the Federal Constitution more reliably than state court
judges.1
4 1
Third, state common law tort schemes are procedurally inferior to
the federal remedy, which has substantive ramifications on the vindica-
tion of constitutional rights. For example, in a section 1983 action, the
plaintiff may receive damages, 4 2 injunctive relief,'43 and attorney's
fees, 1" whereas in a state tort action, damages are often precluded be-
cause of an officer's immunity,141 injunctive relief is generally unavaila-
ble,'46 and attorney's fees are not recoverable. 147  Because of the
procedural advantages of a section 1983 action, especially the attorney's
fee provision, it is more likely that victims of unconstitutional police mis-
conduct will bring federal actions to vindicate their fourteenth amend-
ment rights. Section 1983 was designed to provide private enforcement
of fourteenth amendment rights, and as such, it serves as a deterrent of
police misconduct and official acquiescence in that conduct.' 48 Although
these actions may be burdensome on the federal dockets and the munici-
139. Kupfer, supra note 8, at 466; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105,
1124 (1977).
140. See Durchslag, supra note 98, at 732.
141. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264 (1821).
142. Damages may be awarded against the municipality even if the individual officer is
exonerated by way of the good faith immunity. See Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S.
622 (1980); see also supra note 16.
143. Monell, 436 U.S. at 690-91. See generally, Whitman, supra note 7, at 41-67 (equitable
relief may produce better results than a damage award).
144. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1982). Attorney's fees may be awarded even when the plaintiff is
awarded only nominal damages. Cf Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 266 (1978). This policy
encourages the private enforcement of fourteenth amendment rights.
145. Under state tort law, the right to sue a public entity is generally conferred by statute.
The immunity of an individual agent or officer is generally imputed to the municipality in a
state tort action. See, e.g., Cal. Tort Claims Act, CAL. GOVT. CODE § 815.2(b) (West 1980):
"Except as otherwise provided by statute, a public entity is not liable for an injury resulting
from an act or omission of an employee of the public entity where the employee is immune
from liability."
146. See Kupfer, supra note 8, at 477.
147. The "American rule" is that absent statutory provision or agreement to the contrary,
each party is to pay its own attorney's fees and costs. See Fleischman Distilling Corp. v. Maier
Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967); see, e.g., CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 1021 (West 1980).
148. In a state tort action, the individual actors are often shielded from liability due to
either the good faith immunity, see supra note 16, or the fact that municipal insurance covers
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pal pocketbook, statistics have shown that section 1983 suits help im-
prove police practices.149
Finally, federal court adjudication of constitutional rights does not
impinge on a state's legitimate interest in setting its own standards for
police behavior: the function of the federal courts is to ensure that states
implement procedures and practices which induce constitutionally ade-
quate behavior by individual police officers and their supervisors.15 The
threat of federal suit itself may induce municipalities to act more respon-
sibly to protect constitutional rights."' Thus, federal courts do not in-
terfere with state policymaking authority, rather, they serve as a referee
to ensure that municipal policies and their implementation comport with
constitutional standards.
Conclusion
The Supreme Court decision in Tuttle, by exalting form over sub-
stance, may set an undesirable precedent. If read narrowly, the only sig-
nificant change from Monell will be that a plaintiff must introduce
evidence of more than one incident of unconstitutional police activity
before a municipality can be held liable under section 1983.152 If inter-
preted broadly, however, Tuttle will substantially limit the course and
scope of section 1983 litigation. The limitations imposed by the Tuttle
plurality are constitutionally inadequate in light of the due process guar-
antees of the Fourteenth Amendment.
To remedy the constitutional infirmities posed by Tuttle's per se
rule, the Court should develop a more flexible standard that focuses on
the knowledge of the municipal policymaker charged with inaction. If
an official with knowledge of a police officer's unconstitutional act fails to
take investigative, disciplinary, or other corrective measures, a plaintiff
should have the opportunity to prove that the offending police officer
acted pursuant to an unconstitutional municipal custom or policy. The
hardship to a municipality in defending suits of this nature would be no
greater than it is under the present standard. The hardship on the plain-
tiff, in turn, would be lessened: to survive the pleadings, the plaintiff
would be relieved of the burden to root out past instances of misconduct
the cost of litigation and any damage award. Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of
Tort Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 32 (1974). See also Project, supra note 5. at 810-17.
149. See Blodgett, People v. Police, 71 A.B.A. L.J. 36 (Feb. 1985).
150. See Friedman, supra note 102, at 575-76.
151. See Smith v. Ambrogio, 456 F. Supp. 1130 (D. Conn. 1978) (trial judge dismissed suit
against defendant-municipality on defendant's promise to institute an investigation and disci-
plinary measures, or both, against offending officers).
152. This is a significant burden, because the plaintiff generally does not have access to
police records when the initial pleadings are filed, and plaintiffs are therefore especially vulner-
able to a municipal defendant's motion to dismiss. Cf. Means v. City of Chicago, 535 F. Supp.
455 (N.D. Ill. 1982); see also supra note 40 and accompanying text.
amidst police files. A more flexible standard would better serve the ob-
jective of the Court to limit the number of section 1983 suits against
municipalities, and minimize municipal intrusion upon constitutional
rights.
The Court should de-emphasize its concerns for federalism, the
overcrowded federal court dockets, and the financial burden on munici-
palities, and instead focus on the function of section 1983 suits as a mode
of redress for police misconduct. Section 1983 suits against municipali-
ties are a necessary deterrent to police misconduct, and help to stimulate
institutional reform. Municipalities will not conduct a fluid reevaluation
of their policies and practices unless they are called to task for their fail-
ure to protect constitutional rights. Although section 1983 suits require
the use of valuable time and resources, both municipal and judicial, the
benefits derived from such suits clearly justify the costs.
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